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Failed Indicatorisation: Defining, Comparing and 
Quantifying Social Policy in the ILO’s International 
Survey of Social Services of the Interwar Period 
John Berten ∗ 
Abstract: »Gescheiterte Indikatorisierung: Definition, Vergleich und Quantifizie-
rung von Sozialpolitik durch den International Survey of Social Services der Inter-
nationalen Arbeitsorganisation in der Zwischenkriegszeit«. Despite social policy 
being one of the most quantified policy fields today, there is no singular indi-
cator or set of indicators of social policy quality or performance on the global 
level that is universally accepted and influential, comparable to GDP in the 
economy. The article analyses and explains the unsuccessful indicatorisation in 
the ILO’s International Survey of Social Services of the interwar years. During 
this first elaborate study of social policies worldwide by an international organ-
isation, difficult issues of defining, comparing, and quantifying social policy 
had to be solved for the first time. Theoretically, a sociology of knowledge ap-
proach on indicatorisation is utilised that highlights how social policy was 
questioned and evaluated. This illustrates the demanding work of comparing 
including a politicized knowledge production, identifying conditions and hin-
drances of defining and quantifying the 'social'. It is observed that different 
interests of participants, epistemic cultures, and practices, as well as bureau-
cratic procedures resulted in the mere inclusion of a provisional indicator of 
cost and little quantified data in the final Survey. Empirically, the article relies 
on an in-depth analysis of historical ILO documents. 
Keywords: Social policy, sociology of quantification, indicators, comparison, 
knowledge politics, international bureaucracies, International Labour Organiza-
tion. 
1.   Introduction 
Undisputedly, social policy is one of the most quantified policy fields, today 
unimaginable without numbers (Espeland and Stevens 2008, 406). Identifying 
and counting the population enabled its governing in the first place, as already 
postulated by Foucault (2009, 99-104), and thus statistics fulfilled vital func-
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tions for information-hungry administrations and the military alike (Hacking 
1990). Statistical innovations from ambitious social reformers such as the pov-
erty studies by Booth or Rowntree in the late 19th century framed social policy 
from the beginning (Spicker 1990). The success of social policies in today’s 
performance management and evaluation culture is also strongly tied to the 
availability and quality of numerical inscriptions (Power 2004). Administering 
large social policy schemes relies on numbers to achieve targeting the right 
beneficiaries or identify consequences of implemented policies (Devereux et al. 
2017), a claim also commonplace in a since recently burgeoning literature of 
international organisations on social policy in development contexts (IOs; e.g., 
World Bank 2012). 
Although today, numbers have spread to the global promotion of social jus-
tice and moral concerns (Kelley and Simmons 2015), with social issues and 
development being strongly permeated by indicators (Goodwin 2017), there is 
no singular indicator or index (or set of indicators) of social policy, social secu-
rity or social protection quality or performance on the global level that is uni-
versally accepted, comparable to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the econ-
omy or the Human Development Index (HDI). GDP has fundamentally 
influenced the profession of economics in general (Fioramonti 2013) and has 
also been a cornerstone of the emergence of development politics. It has 
achieved this hegemony, despite much criticism from inside the economic field 
itself, e.g., regarding its application towards subsistence-based economies in 
the global South by the economist Colin Clarke (Speich 2011). 
During the same time period as the economist Kuznets developed the mod-
ern concept of GDP – during the 1930s –, the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) was involved in the first international comparative observation of 
social policies: the International Survey of Social Services (published in a first 
edition in 1933 and a second edition, divided into two volumes, in 1936; see 
ILO 1933a; 1936a; 1936b).1 Although not all countries of the world were as-
sessed in the Survey, since neither ILO membership was global, nor did all 
member states of the ILO participate, the study gathered an impressive and at 
that time unprecedented amount of participant countries and schemes. Despite 
discussing several options of indicators of social policy during its production 
process, the final publication does not contain any, and little quantified data 
overall. 
Why did the Survey not include any indicators, and, additionally, can this 
give us indications of why there is still no commonly accepted and universal 
indicator of social policy, social security, or social protection quality or per-
                                                             
1  As will be detailed later, ‘social services’ refers here to a variety of social programmes that 
include social insurance and social assistance measures, housing, family allowance, and holi-
days with pay. Terminological obscurity is not to be ‘solved’ by this research, but an im-
portant empirical insight, same as the (temporary) fixing of boundaries. 
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formance on the global level?2 Social security – as one of the core institutions 
of social policy and the welfare state – today fields a range of indicators, many 
developed and used by IOs, but these do not relate to an overall appreciation of 
its quality or performance, but merely to single dimensions, addressing input, 
process, output, outcome or impact (EC 2017), or to sub-types of social securi-
ty (see, e.g., for pensions Peeters et al. 2014), and many are qualitative in na-
ture (ILO 2013a). 
Instead of a transcendent perspective of observation uncovering general 
conditions of indicator production, the article follows the knowledge produc-
tion process of the Survey itself to reconstruct settlements as well as contested 
issues on the level of social policy knowledge. ‘Indicatorisation’ is a demand-
ing procedure, even more so in a transnational context. In epistemic terms, it 
relies on categorising, comparing and quantifying, in a case that misses clear, 
seemingly ‘fixed’ boundaries between issues. In political terms, it touches upon 
various contested issues, bringing together multiple participants with varying 
interests and epistemic cultures in an international bureaucracy characterised 
by complex organisational procedures. The article shows how, because of these 
difficulties in epistemic, political and organisational terms, the final Survey 
merely includes what can be termed a provisional, incomplete indicator of cost 
of social policies, but nonetheless has laid the foundation for the further quanti-
fication of social policy worldwide and even contains the roots of the later 
post-WWII social security framework. 
Theoretically, the article draws on a sociology of knowledge framework, in-
fused by an understanding of the fundamentally political nature of bureaucratic 
politics. Newer studies of knowledge in politics have illustrated the importance 
of examining instruments of world-making – observation and interaction – that 
make possible certain ways of conceiving and dealing with the world, in the 
form of the ‘ontic furniture’ of politics (Power 2004, 766), epistemic infrastruc-
ture (Bueger 2015), or ‘infrapolitics’ (Voß and Freeman 2016, 5-6). Empirical-
ly, the article relies on an in-depth analysis of historical documents obtained at 
the ILO archives as well as scanned ILO documents publicly available online.3 
The empirical material has been examined using a Grounded Theory-based 
                                                             
2  As somewhat of an exception, see the ADB’s Social Protection Index, yet note how it did not 
(yet) diffuse to other regions of the world than Asia and has been criticised for its inherent 
reductionism and the exclusion of normative aspects such as social rights and solidarity 
(ADB 2013; Priwitzer 2009). Another recent example of an ‘overarching’ indicator, though 
not from an IO, is the Social Protection Floor Index, geared towards measuring progress to-
wards the ILO project of ‘social protection floors’ (Bierbaum et al. 2017) and as such clearly 
related to a specific function. 
3  The research is part of a PhD project interested in the development of social security statis-
tics, indicators, and other numerical tools of IOs. I am especially grateful to the Internation-
al Labour Organization, for having me granted access to their archival collections and thus 
making this research possible. 
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research design attentive to identifying debates and contentious issues on defi-
nition, classification, and comparison.4 
After a short descriptive account of the knowledge activities regarding so-
cial policy by the ILO in the interwar period (2), the article delves into prereq-
uisites and obstacles of indicatorisation (3). In the empirical section of the 
article, it is analysed – all in relation to potentially controversial debates – how 
comparison per se became questioned and politicised (4.1), and how the Survey 
produced equivalence, i.e., defined the field of social services (4.2), observed 
difference, i.e., discussed criteria of comparison (4.3), but ultimately included 
little quantification, merely a provisional indicator of cost (4.4). 
2. The International Labour Organization of the Interwar 
Period: Standard-Setting in Law and Knowledge 
Founded as an organisation dedicated to establishing international regulation to 
protect workers, the ILO has a tripartite structure: at the International Labour 
Conference, as well as its Governing Body (GB), it includes not only govern-
mental, but also employers’ and workers’ representatives. It is also one of the 
oldest IOs still in existence and has outlived the League of Nations which has 
been established at the same time. 
Even though the ILO was primarily tasked with improving labour legisla-
tion, and while the ‘globalisation of social policy’ (Deacon 2007) remains 
fragmented, with no IO being predominantly responsible for social policy, the 
organisation has early on influenced social policies worldwide through its 
standard-setting activities as well as its knowledge work (see the contributions 
in Kott and Droux 2013, and Conrad 2006). During the interwar period, the 
ILO implemented 13 conventions covering diverse social security policies, 
although these were rarely signed (Kott 2010). In addition, the ILO published 
numerous studies on social policy, conducted expert conferences, and answered 
requests for information, becoming an “international point of reference for 
research and expertise (...).” (Rodgers et al. 2009, 148).5 Thereby, its functions 
                                                             
4  The approach is similar to Merry’s (2011, 85) project of an ‘ethnography of indicators’, 
meaning “examining the history of the creation of an indicator and its underlying theory, 
observing expert group meetings and international discussions where the terms of the indi-
cator are debated and defined, (…) observing data-collection processes”, however without 
actual participation, and instead relying on document analysis alone. Luckily, the ILO has 
from its inception implemented a stringent archival policy. 
5  Requests for information for the Social Insurance Section alone had skyrocketed from 42 in 
1924 to 140 in 1930. Requests for information included advice on bills, technical advice on 
schemes, reports for conferences, technical studies, and collaboration (ILO 1931a, 130). A 
huge part of requests focused on social security; from almost 1000 requests overall in 1931, 
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as diplomatic body, clearing house, intermediary between nations, and ‘social 
library’ (Kott 2010) might have had more impact than a unilateral focus on its 
traditional standard-setting activities might assert. 
With the International Survey of Social Services the outlook of the organisa-
tion on social policies was broadened. The Survey itself did not aim at produc-
ing a universal, transnational indicator of social service quality or performance, 
even though it discussed options of indicators. It nonetheless impacted the 
possibilities of indicators as well as the general development of social policies. 
First, because the Survey was an initial step towards developing a global 
knowledge infrastructure on social security, it has been the foundation for later 
comparative studies. In the late 1940s, the ILO built on the Survey with the 
influential, multi-volume Cost of Social Security (ILO 1947, 82; ISSA 1955, 
9), succeeded in 1999 by the Social Security Inquiry (ILO 2005), which is the 
foundation for the new World Social Protection Database (ILO 2017). There-
by, it had path-dependent ramifications for how social policies were subse-
quently defined and viewed. Second, at the time of its production, there was no 
overarching concept of social policies yet (such as ‘social security’), and wel-
fare states were not yet widespread in Europe and beyond. Therefore, the Sur-
vey’s producers had to unite on common trajectories and define the content of 
the ‘social’.6 They had to consider difficult questions for the first time: what – 
if anything – should be compared, and how? What was conceived as common 
between social schemes of countries with widely differing traditions of social 
policy that encountered and perceived different social problems and were at 
varying stages of economic development (similarly Yeates 2001, 169)? 
3. Analysing Indicatorisation in Global Social Policy 
According to research of international bureaucracies, IOs derive much of their 
authority in global politics from their expertise (Littoz-Monnet 2017; Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004, 20-29). We know, however, more about functions and 
consequences of this ‘politics by knowledge’ and less about how it is generated 
in the first place (Voß and Freeman 2016; but see, e.g., Bueger 2015). I argue 
that material and/ or epistemic practices, processes and technologies shape or 
even actively invent political phenomena. It is necessary to open up the ‘black 
box’ of an instrument of knowledge and its production process, resulting in a 
politics of bureaucratic and expert knowledge production, to analyse how di-
                                                                                                                                
120 were related to social insurance. That was the second most requested topic that year 
after conditions of work (hours of labour and wages; ILO 1932, 103). 
6  Notwithstanding the fact that the ‘social’ does not have a fixed meaning, still, and is much 
more contested than, e.g., the ‘economic’ or the ‘political’ (see e.g., Leisering 2003, 177). 
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verging interpretations in contested debates decide upon the shape of an in-
strument, which then again functions as a ‘lens’ in observations. 
Indicators are a variant of quantification that has especially in recent dec-
ades proliferated in global discourses (Davis et al. 2012). Just like quantifica-
tion in general, indicators make visible phenomena through measurement, 
simplifying information and reducing complexity (Heintz 2012, 12). In global 
politics, they represent and evaluate the past or projected performance of actors 
by reference to standards (Davis et al. 2012, 6). While most critical research 
focuses on the consumption of numbers, such as its use as a powerful govern-
ing and management device (Hansen and Porter 2012), there are recent advanc-
es in the field that deliver insights into its production as well (Huelss 2017). 
Producing numbers requires abstracting from meanings and ignoring differ-
ences, thereby imagining categories that represent ‘sameness’, and inventing 
new relations (Heintz 2010). The sociology and economy of conventions has 
alluded to the importance of ‘making equivalent’, as the basis of any 
(e)valuation between units (Thévenot 2016, 97). Espeland and Stevens’ (1998) 
described ‘commensuration’ as the process of comparing different entities 
according to a common metric. However, putting units inside a category is 
neither necessarily the same as making included units (entirely) equal, nor does 
commensuration always rely on common metrics (Heintz 2010, 164). Accord-
ing to Heintz (2016, 316), the basal process underlying quantification is com-
paring – an epistemic practice in its own right, consisting of, first, categorical 
unification, i.e., viewing units as similar, while second, observing (gradual) 
difference, in relation to a criterion of comparison. As a result, new relation-
ships of meaning between units are produced that are being viewed as similar 
in one or many respects, but also as different in at least one other dimension. 
Quantifying units adds a common metric, resulting in a particular case of com-
parison. 
The question of what is comparable (and what not) cannot be answered by 
looking at the categories themselves (e.g., their ‘nature’), but has social and 
political reasons (Heintz 2010, 164). On what grounds can we analyse the 
knowledge production process then? 
Several authors point to the fundamental role of politics (see also Diaz-Bone 
2019 and Thévenot 2019, in this issue). “Whether or not something is made a 
datum is the result of scientific or political struggles.” (Thévenot 2016, 99). 
Numbers do not passively record and measure the social, but are products of 
interpretation and contingent methodological choices that can be investigated 
in their own right (Starr 1987, 48-52). Classifying and comparing  
exhibit traces of social conflicts, social investments and collective efforts to 
implement a representation of a collective as a (socially recognised and offi-
cially secured category in classifications. (Diaz-Bone 2017, 242) 
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In regards to social policy, these representations also relate to other contested 
issues, such as social problem definitions, solutions to these problems, the roles 
of the state, employees and employers. 
Since comparisons can be criticised and contested, they involve work. Gen-
erally, legitimacy of a framework of comparison is attained if a construction 
seems self-evident and if it refers to others that already field high legitimacy 
(Espeland and Stevens 2008, 403-8). Often, categorising relies on knowledge 
conventions, which form the principles or logics that guide interpretation as 
well as (e)valuation (Diaz-Bone 2017, 239). 
However, despite the importance of political struggles, knowledge produc-
tion in international bureaucracies is subject to a variety of influencing factors, 
dictated by epistemic cultures, as well as the product of organisational process-
es. Experts and epistemic communities share common ways of approaching 
problems and devising solutions, and complex organisations such as the ILO 
develop specific procedures to structure decision-making. 
To answer its research question, the article reconstructs how social policy 
has been observed and evaluated and how schemes have been compared, fol-
lowing the production process of transnational knowledge. Thereby, it aims to 
identify conditions and hindrances of developing common ground and – ulti-
mately – the construction of indicators. Before even alternatives of indicators 
are fielded against existing ones, observing and analysing classification, com-
parison, and quantification results in an investigation of the principles that 
manage relations between categories in social policy at the same time as it 
leads to an appreciation of the politics of expert knowledge production in IOs, 
mediated by bureaucratic and expert cultures and instruments of observation. 
4. Defining, Comparing, and Quantifying Social Policy: 
Observing the International Survey of Social Services 
4.1  To Compare, or Not to Compare 
The following analysis will regularly refer to the production process of the 
Survey, which is reproduced in Table 1, including the respective decision of the 
Governing Body of the ILO. 
Since comparing is a basic social (and psychological) process and will al-
ways only partly be reflected upon, the essential necessity of comparing for the 
production of the Survey has not found its way into debates itself. The aspects 
that were contested tell us, however, about the diverging positions regarding 
comparison, related to organisational roles, discursive contexts, and epistemic 
cultures. 
First, doubts regarding the British proposal to study ‘social charges’ (see 
Table 1) were raised based on practical grounds. The Director criticised the 
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high complexity of a complete comparison between social charges, resulting in 
too much of a burden for the organisation that would be in need of much more 
manpower, if it was to undertake the study (ILO 1926a, 69-70; ILO 1926b, 
157). Related, second, was general criticism based on data availability or quali-
ty, with even official statistics from industrialised countries having been in-
complete or inexact. The Correspondence Committee, asked to provide a first 
evaluation of the planned study, saw hindrances especially in diverging nation-
al economic developments and contexts, including different currencies, and 
thus proposed that the Office should reduce errors of methods first, producing 
separate reports by country and industry, before thinking about possibilities of 
further comparison (ILO 1926c, 411-5). 
Table 1: The Production Process of the International Survey of Social Services, 
1926-1936 
Participant       Date/period Intervention Governing Body decision 
British govern-
ment, at the 30th 
Meeting of the 
Governing Body 
1926 
Proposal to study cost of 
social services in chief indus-
trial countries (detailed in a 
second letter at the 31st 
Meeting of the Governing 
Body) 
Despite ILO Director’s doubts 
regarding complexity, Corre-
spondence Committee was 
convened to provide advice on 
planned study 
Correspondence 
Committee on 
Social Insurance 
1926 
Approved of Survey, but 
pointed to dangers of misuse; 
worried about unilateral cost-
based statistics, which left out 
‘unmeasurable’ productive 
benefits 
Criticised ‘philosophical’ report; 
founded ‘Committee on Social 
Charges’ instead (consisting of 
Governing Body representatives 
and country experts) 
Office 
1926 
- 
1930 
Produced preliminary study  
of selected countries 
Not deemed publication-worthy; 
work should continue 
Committee on 
Social Charges 
1929 
- 
1937 
Debated issues around cate-
gories and (criteria of) com-
parison, throughout produc-
tion of the Survey 
Convened 9 times 
Office 
1930 
- 
1936 
Produced actual Survey 
studies (information sent back 
to governments for verifica-
tion and completion, returned 
to Office); decided on con-
crete standardisation of 
information 
Approved study for publication 
in 1933 (first edition, 24 coun-
tries) and 1936 (second edition, 
two volumes of 19 countries 
each): containing 3-year-old 
information on population 
statistics, social insurance, social 
assistance, housing, family all-
owances, and holidays with pay 
Source: Own Compilation. 
 
Some Governing Body (GB) members equally saw different costs of produc-
tion and revenues as a grave hindrance to comparison, referring to the idiosyn-
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cracy of countries, although these statements were linked with a more political, 
third argument: the danger of illegitimate conclusions. Already the Corre-
spondence Committee, being asked to provide an opinion on the British pro-
posal of a study of social services, urged the Office to be mindful of the relative 
character of comparison results and to inform about the dangers involved in 
drawing absolute conclusions from these (ILO 1926c, 411-5). The fear of pos-
sible politicisation was especially brought forth by the workers’ group and 
other more social legislation-friendly members in the GB who not only warned 
that comparisons could undermine the ILO’s claim of being a neutral mediator 
for its constituents, by forcing the organisation to state its position on costs of 
social services, but also claimed that observations could be misleading (ILO 
1926d). As an example of a misunderstanding generated by a simplified cost-
based comparison, they cited the case of countries with large families. These 
would inherently face greater social charges which would of course not justify 
a worse rating than countries with smaller families (ILO 1926c, 337-9). 
The controversy can be explained by the discursive context, impacting how 
participating actors conceived of others’ intentions. The Survey fell into a time 
of scepticism regarding social legislation (Kott 2010). This aroused suspicions 
that the proposal for the Survey was not that innocent at all. Dominant dis-
courses around a negative conception of social policies as a burden on produc-
tion and as cost to be reduced, transformed comparing per se into a political 
issue. This also explains the Correspondence Committee’s insistence on posi-
tive benefits of social policies, arguing in its report that these cannot be reduced 
to a mere cost, but involve a ‘productive’ dimension, such as ensuring social 
stability, improving health, and securing earning capacity. The discursive con-
text mediates how and when institutional knowledge production attempts are 
initiated and also impacts how they transform, although not in an inevitable 
way. The timing of the British proposal and its thematic focus can be explained 
by these broader discourses around the reduction of public costs and questions 
of international economic competition (hence the term ‘social charges’ that is 
frequently utilised instead of ‘cost’ and especially denotes its role in the costs 
of production). 
Proponents of comparison in the GB on the other hand raised the concern 
that simply not doing it would not only push the Survey away from the initial 
proposal, but also governments  
had the right to know what other countries were doing in the same sphere, so 
as to be sure that the real object of the Treaty, which was to improve the lot of 
the workers, was being honestly carried out. (ILO 1926c, 339)  
Comparisons were ‘made anyway’, but the ILO could at least provide high 
quality data. This argument, stressing mission and responsibility of the ILO to 
its constituents (including workers), won over even workers’ representatives. 
The doubts raised for instance by the Correspondence Committee regarding 
illegitimate conclusions thereby receded into the background. 
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Analysis of the opposition to, as well as proponents of comparison also 
shows the importance of keeping in mind the roles that participating actors in 
the process of knowledge production play, some of which at the same time 
constitute representatives of participating agencies (e.g., members of participat-
ing governments), decision-makers in the organisation (e.g., members of the 
ILO’s GB), as well as the public that the Survey is directed at. This goes along 
with (potentially) differing interests (even within subjects), as well as different 
approaches and stances. The Director’s concerns regarding practicability are 
directly explainable by his role in the organisation, as head of the Office. The 
Office primarily fulfils administrative duties and abstains from officially voic-
ing a position, but is nonetheless, in conducting the bulk of the actual work, left 
to deal with unresolved issues and thereby crucially involved in the final out-
come. The GB members are at the same time decision-makers in an ILO capac-
ity, deciding upon the further shape of the production process, as well as repre-
sentatives of government agencies, workers’ and employers’ organisations, 
potentially themselves objects and addressees of the Survey, and thus in need of 
alternating between different roles. They were however aware of the essentially 
political function of cost comparison, and hid their respective political agendas 
related to whom they represented behind arguments of method, value, and 
(unintended) effect of comparison. 
Notwithstanding, the final Survey was not integrated by an indicator and no 
comparative tables between countries were presented. The chapters, differenti-
ated by country, list population data, describe social services, and present cost 
statistics, all according to a unified framework but not a shared metric, so ob-
servers would have to relate elements to each other themselves. The next sec-
tions will reveal that unsolved debates about what and how to compare were 
responsible. 
4.2  What to Compare: Producing Equivalence 
The Survey was the first international comparative knowledge production exer-
cise of social policies in the ILO. It could not draw upon existing experiences. 
Comparative endeavours, before, were entirely restricted to single sub-types of 
social policy, such as sickness insurance, and were prepared for specific func-
tions, such as International Labour Conferences (ILO 1926a, 70). The Survey, 
for the first time, entailed the need to delimit the field of social policies, an-
swering questions such as what constituted the similarity between schemes 
with a social scope. The most overarching problem that the Office, the GB, and 
the two Committees dealt with was the object of the Survey, in the final publi-
cation labelled ‘social services’, related to two main issues: general problems 
of definition and demarcation, and the inclusion of social assistance apart from 
social insurance. 
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4.2.1  Defining ‘Social Services’ 
Social policies in the interwar years were missing an overarching, integrating 
conceptual category. For a survey, it is in principle not necessary to develop a 
strong, unifying concept of the included policies; an ordering device such as a 
simple list would suffice. The British proposal merely listed ‘social services’ of 
interest, based on certain risks (see Table 1). However, to make a comparison 
on the grounds of a standard criterion plausible, such as through a (quantified) 
indicator, the compared units would have to be conceived as sharing common 
characteristics. This involves work whose amount does not lie in the compared 
issue itself, such as its ‘nature’, but is an outcome of a social construction. In 
the case of collective actors and contested issues, success or failure depends on 
which claims stressing similarity or dissimilarity prevail over others. 
The Correspondence Committee’s report followed a risk-based definition of 
social services, after differentiating these between compensatory, rehabilitative, 
and mitigating functions. Risks were classified by origin – physical (accidents, 
sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age, and death) and economic (unemploy-
ment) (ILO 1926c, 410-1).7 This was widely in line with the British proposal 
and existing knowledge conventions, such as the ILO’s ‘Series M’ on social 
insurance which documented intricacies of specific types of schemes (e.g., ILO 
1925). More fundamental was to determine that 'social services' should protect 
the ‘worker’ (which was at times equated with being ‘beneficial for the wider 
population’). This was felt necessary to exclude public services in general, such 
as the postal service. Despite the GB’s criticism of the Committee’s report, this 
definition was upheld even until the final publication (ILO 1926c, 413; ILO 
1929a, 2). 
Although somewhat vague and interpretation-dependent, the definition de-
cided a later debate on the inclusion of family allowances paid by employers, 
and impacted one on paid holidays. Despite that family responsibilities were 
not deemed coverable by compulsory insurance but constituted individual and 
voluntary matters, the Committee on Social Charges argued from the empirical 
standpoint that members of a worker’s family were covered by these, too, and 
thus family allowances should be included (ILO 1926c, 414-5). In the case of 
paid holidays on the other hand, we observe that classifiers referred to different 
levels to bolster their claims (Diaz-Bone 2017, 241). Some critics in the GB 
considered these part of wages, not social charges, arguing from the perspec-
tive of employers and costs of production. Others, on similar grounds, voted for 
their inclusion, by referring to social assistance which could also be explained 
                                                             
7  Counting unemployment as an economic risk and all others as ‘physical’, i.e., not economic 
(since they cannot be both), the experts somewhat relieved the economy of its responsibil-
ity. Viewing unemployment at least partly as a structural issue and not as an individual’s 
fault alone has also been a rather recent accomplishment (Whiteside 2015). 
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as part of wages, as supplementary wage, or substitute, linking paid holidays to 
their economic function for the individual. Again others occupied a legal 
standpoint, by making their inclusion dependent from countries’ specific social 
legislation and, ergo, uniqueness. Pragmatism won: it was decided to put fami-
ly allowances and paid holidays into different sections to avoid confusion – the 
issue was termed ‘theoretical’, since at that point, comparison through a com-
mon criterion was not envisaged any longer, anyway. It was a tight vote how-
ever, criticised because it could be misconstrued as being the official ILO posi-
tion (ILO 1931b, 284-90). 
Less an object of debate, but equally consequential, was the actual scope of 
the study. The British proposal envisaged a focus on chief industrialised coun-
tries, interested in practical and politically usable knowledge (ILO 1926b, 202-
3). The specific selection of countries was left to the Office which decided on 
the grounds of social policy tradition, as well as probable availability of data 
(ILO 1933a; ILO 1937, 2). The first criterion was obviously chosen because it 
suggests comparability, i.e., sameness. At the same time, this incorporated a 
bias towards Europe, in addition to some other countries that would later be 
called ‘Western’, but can also be explained by the fact that the world of indus-
trialised countries of the 1920s/ 1930s that had social policy legislation in place 
almost equalled Europe and North-America, with some exceptions. The argu-
ment of data availability is more pragmatic in essence, but inevitable, since 
countries included needed to have the administrative capacity to measure their 
policies. 
Apparently, neither were the guidelines entirely sufficient, nor could a sim-
ple list of services do the endeavour justice, so the Office was given wide lee-
way to decide on actual inclusion of schemes, as well as their standardisation. 
Conforming national peculiarities to a standard definition was necessary, since 
terminologies and actual schemes differed by country and deviated from the 
ideal types imagined (ILO 1929a, 2-3). The process, however, remains almost 
entirely impenetrable, since there is no documentation of this work by the 
Office. We can assert that the Office had a decade of standard-setting experi-
ence in social policy knowledge, drawing upon a frame that informed how to 
delimit the field of social policy, not treading on new ground entirely. Series 
‘M’, on social insurance, can be seen as a conceptual toolbox that delivered 
standard categories and classifications for ‘making things similar’. 
4.2.2  Social Insurance vs. Social Assistance 
A second problem of classification was related to the continuing tension be-
tween the two primary ways of delivering social services – either via social 
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insurance or via social assistance (or ‘relief’).8 Although this tension seldom 
reached open conflict, different protagonists inside the Bismarckian-oriented 
ILO, such as Great Britain, Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, preferred 
social assistance-type measures, for different reasons such as their welfare 
traditions (Rodgers et al. 2009, 145). 
Again, the arguments refer to different levels of classification. Some propo-
nents, such as the Correspondence Committee and members of the Committee 
on Social Charges argued that exclusion of social assistance would not show 
the real costs of covering risks, with some countries choosing to cover risks in 
different ways, paying benefits out of the general taxes, which sometimes ac-
counted for huge amounts of public expenditure. In many countries social 
assistance and insurance would also coexist, as necessary complement or step-
ping in when the latter did not apply. Both arguments rely on norms of thor-
oughness. Others followed a functional logic, arguing that social assistance 
covered risks just the same as insurance. Especially the Office followed a 
pragmatic rationale, noting how social assistance statistics were often only of 
limited value, since not being under state jurisdiction, not following the same 
administrative rigour and reporting standards as social insurance or because of 
unclear conditions of payment, if data was existent at all (sometimes, statistics 
of social assistance schemes had to be collected anew). Others, such as the 
Correspondence Committee, argued against social assistance, based on the 
worker criterion which many social assistance benefits did not conform to. This 
marginalised social assistance, by making social insurance characteristics a 
guiding criterion for its inclusion, sufficing only when it was directed to the 
‘worker’ and/or his family (ILO 1926c, 413; ILO 1929a, 8; ILO 1929b, 329, 
365-6).9 
Since the Committee on Social Charges could not come to a conclusion, an 
Office intervention in the form of a study of the empirical facts finally led to 
the decision to treat the problem pragmatically, leaving it to governments’ 
                                                             
8  Actually, it is common to differentiate between social assistance, which is often viewed as 
conferring a right to the individual, and relief which resembles charity and is not rights-
based (see, e.g., Seekings 2007, 536). However, the ILO context with its multiple languages 
and translations makes analyses based on these finer divisions quite difficult. Instead of 
linking one or the other concept to rights, this article proceeds by observing when and how 
a rights-linkage is made in actual publications, irrespective of whether ‘social assistance’ or 
‘relief’ is the term spoken of. 
9  Social assistance services were, and still are, often not institutionalised on the national level, 
but are organised on the federal and local level. Still in the 1990s, data availability led to 
problems for doing comparative research on social assistance (Eardley et al. 1996, 110). It is 
not natural per se, that social services are aggregated on the national level. Partly, this has 
thus to be analysed as an artefact, generated by knowledge infrastructures such as the Sur-
vey, whose consequences await further study. It produces new relations of meaning, to take 
the nation state as the natural level of analysis in knowledge production irrespective of so-
cial policies’ actual level of implementation. 
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judgements, adding that definitions ‘should not be interpreted too rigidly’ (ILO 
1931a, 125-6). This pragmatic stance, leaving the publication with somewhat 
varying scope and precision, undermined an otherwise surprising fact: that, 
following a recommendation from the Correspondence Committee’s report, 
only those social assistance services should be included in the Survey which 
“guarantee a right to the beneficiary in virtue of legislation, or of a contract or 
rule” (ILO 1926c, 410; ILO 1933a, viii). Statements of influential scholars in 
social policy that social assistance, based on means-testing, does not embrace 
or consider social citizenship rights (see, e.g., Korpi 1989, or Esping-Andersen 
1990, 22, 48), are thus empirically contradicted: at least in transnational 
knowledge generation, social assistance, and rights were coupled already be-
fore WWII. In effect, this rule establishes a formal preference for specific types 
of social assistance. Herewith, we can also add to Kaufmann’s (2015, 177) 
argument of the internationalisation of the welfare state after WWII which 
links social transfers to rights, by pointing to the partial realisation of this idea 
already through the pre-WWII Survey. Of course, its realisation is at the same 
time constrained in two ways, by specifying that social assistance included 
should target workers instead of the whole population (sometimes equating the 
first with the latter), as well as by effectively leaving the decision of in- or 
exclusion of social assistance policies to the countries themselves. 
Overall, the subordination of social assistance under criteria fitting social in-
surance is not surprising per se, given the ILO’s tradition of labour legislation. 
It shows the impact of powerful existing conventions of knowledge. The mi-
nority groups inside the ILO could not fully establish their preference of social 
assistance in the organisation. Only recently, social assistance has finally been 
acknowledged fully, by linking it to the ‘social protection floors’ campaign that 
aims at implementing social assistance-type ‘social cash transfers’ in the global 
South (Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). 
However, the lack of a distinct unifying concept of social services integrat-
ing both forms of providing welfare did not facilitate the grounds for compari-
son through a common indicator. 
4.2.3  A Stepping Stone towards Social Security? 
The Survey was in need of much more work on boundary-making than first 
envisaged. The absolute need for strict rules of in- and exclusion arose because 
of epistemic cultures that valued exactitude, methodically sound standards, and 
comprehensiveness, and connected the possibility of comparison via an indica-
tor with the need to clearly define the object of the Survey. However, some 
concerns could not be overcome. Questions of what constituted part of the 
social and what part of the economic sphere (wages) were hotly debated, in 
some cases without agreement; these still characterise the field until today 
(Leisering 2003). 
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Differences in underlying conceptions of the terms and ideas prevalent in 
national legislation and discourse seemed to be carried into the experts’ views 
and the Governing Body. Ideational preferences as well as practical considera-
tions were decisive factors in coming to at least provisional conclusions, which 
is for instance visible in the strong ILO influence regarding its preferential 
treatment of social insurance. At the same time, the transformation of the Brit-
ish’s pragmatic stance, signified by the mere list of social services, to the more 
comprehensive project of the final Survey tells us that a knowledge production 
process in international bureaucracies can develop a life of its own. Several 
experts and Office members intervened, so that the final product did neither 
simply emerge out of a rational process, nor was controllable by a single actor. 
Still, the deliberations furthered the demarcation of social services and laid 
the foundation for later studies, as well as for the invention of the concept of 
social security that only a few years later, during and after WWII, established 
itself in the ILO. ‘Social security’ was oriented on Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ 
policies of the 1930s which are commonly attributed as originators of the term 
(Rodgers et al. 2009, 147). Especially the coupling of social assistance towards 
rights – though realised only in a limited way – expresses a foreshadowing of 
the later Philadelphia reconstitution of the ILO that similarly postulates a 
rights-based character of social security (ILO 1944). Nonetheless, it is not yet 
apparent that the Survey already overcame class-based politics and acknowl-
edged social policy to be about the whole population, although at times its 
producers equated the protection of workers with the whole population, for 
instance when deciding upon the inclusion of social assistance (see e.g., ILO 
1929a, 2). 
4.3  How to Compare: Observing Difference 
Although the Correspondence Committee was critical of comparing countries’ 
social services with a shared criterion, its report still discussed viable options. 
Instead of comparing total expenditures in respective local currencies with each 
other, ignoring their different foundations – which is actually what the final 
publication allows – the report proposed several ratios. Social charges (either 
the total borne by the national community, production, or a given industry) 
could be compared with an individual (per inhabitant or per worker), with the 
total amount of wages, or with national income or production. Since the man-
ner in which social costs were distributed would vary by scheme, the experts 
found it preferable to take into account the whole amount of the costs, irrespec-
tive of who paid for them (ILO 1926c, 337, 414-5). 
The Correspondence Committee nonetheless vigorously criticised compari-
sons, because the study would leave out individual initiative to cover risks as 
well as other social legislation that could not be quantified (such as hours of 
labour), and would thereby paint an incomplete picture of social costs. Even if 
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the study should be about the industries’ ability to meet international competi-
tion, this would not merely depend on social charges, would vary from country 
to country and industry to industry, and a survey would not be able to deter-
mine its incidence. 
More than that, the Correspondence Committee aimed at changing the per-
spective on ‘social charges’ entirely. The Correspondence Committee critically 
interpreted the British proposal as part of a political programme to reduce costs 
in light of high social expenditure. The experts argued that this perception had 
its origins in the economic consequences of WWI. Social expenditure would be 
in the focus especially because it seemed easiest to reduce out of all the costs of 
production, apart from wages (ILO 1926c, 409). 
Its report strongly argued that rather than being a mere ‘cost’ on society or 
production, social policies provided multiple economic, financial, and social 
benefits, among them social stability, the improvement of health, and securing 
the workers’ capacity to earn (ILO 1926c, 412-5).  
Social insurance involves expense, but provides a quid pro quo (...). It is clear-
ly impossible to evaluate this equivalent. The result therefore (...) is that the 
debit side is thrown into relief, while the credit side is passed over in silence. 
In the case of States where the system of social insurance is highly developed 
a considerable burden will be noted, whilst it will be impossible to set against 
it figures representing an equally considerable gain in respect of health and ef-
ficiency. (ILO 1926c, 412)  
Obviously, having found their position in danger of losing credibility in the 
face of a unilaterally economistic discourse, the experts tried to (re-)gain epis-
temic authority on this issue. However, they simultaneously admitted that such 
economic or social value would be difficult to quantify (different to monetary 
cost), which weakened their position and curtailed the possibilities of deliver-
ing a powerful counterargument (ILO 1926c, 412). 
Although some critical voices in the GB similarly objected to the cost-based 
comparison, since it allowed illegitimate conclusions and could weaken the 
struggle for further social legislation (ILO 1926c, 339-41), more criticised the 
Committee’s ‘overstepping of boundaries’, delivering an entirely ‘philosophi-
cal’ and normative treatise rather than discussing questions of method, as en-
visaged. The political nature of the deliberations becomes obvious, with, on the 
one hand, the Correspondence Committee pointing to the selectivity and poli-
tics of measuring and, on the other hand, the GB, preventing any further meet-
ing of the Correspondence Committee, aiming to steer the issue back to ques-
tions of method and standardisation, overruling the critical voices. The further 
process of knowledge production did not anymore mention productive benefits. 
The final publication mentions it in its foreword, but does not further elaborate 
on it and thereby made it almost invisible, ‘black-boxing’ this controversially 
discussed subject (ILO 1933a, vii). 
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Asked about the ideas of the Correspondence Committee regarding compar-
isons, the Office debunked most as not meaningful. Others, such as the ratio of 
social services’ cost to national income or production, were regarded as impos-
sible to calculate due to missing data. Although the Committee on Social 
Charges criticised the Office’s pessimism, it concluded that the final study 
should not include ‘international comparison’ and that readers should be 
warned to do so. Nonetheless and, as it turns out, correctly, they expressed the 
opinion that the future might bring the possibility of such a comparison (ILO 
1931a, 127). 
The case shows that possibilities of comparison were already imagined, but 
were seen as impossible to be realised, due to missing data. Notwithstanding, 
these were entirely based on costs, since the arguments for social policies’ 
productive value were hampered by problems of measurability and could not 
gain currency in the organisation. The struggles are obviously linked to politi-
cal arguments pro or against social policy, with debates around possibilities of 
comparison intermingled with issues of value of social policy. 
4.4 The International Survey of Social Services: Little 
Quantification, no Indicator 
Despite the fact that many participant countries of the Survey in the interwar 
period had the means to produce, or already possessed, advanced statistics of 
their respective schemes, the Survey did not include much numerical infor-
mation, except on general data of the population and cost-based scheme statis-
tics. The final Survey did neither present, nor reflect upon comparisons, and 
experts and Office staff – led by ideas of exactitude and comprehensiveness – 
argued against doing comparative studies. At the same time, the debates show 
that indicators were debated, yet finally not realised due to several missing 
prerequisites of comparison. 
For an indicator of performance or quality of social services, a unifying con-
cept of social services is needed that satisfies two conditions: normative and 
cognitive integration. The degree of integration can vary, but the units forming 
part of the category ‘social services’ at least have to be viewed as being basi-
cally the same, so that an indicator can evaluate their differences. This equates 
to a common theory or concept that could guide an evaluation. 
In how far did the Survey or their producers draw on normative aspects that 
the measured phenomenon (‘social services’) shares? Discussions around social 
policies in the diverse expert committees and the Governing Body show multi-
ple, sometimes conflicting social political ideas and norms that prohibit a clear 
hegemonic position of one or the other concept which would have facilitated 
comparability. Social policies have always relied on a multiplicity of ideologi-
cal traditions, among them social democracy, liberalism, and social conserva-
tism, as most abstract social ideas (Leisering 2009, 578). Even today, the ‘so-
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cial’ is only vaguely defined. Not only vague normative underpinnings of the 
field itself, but also the fact that this multiplicity has been carried into the ILO, 
due to tripartism, made an agreement on common grounds of comparison un-
likely. The later concept of social security on the other hand was based on a 
normative integration; social insurance and social assistance were bound to the 
state’s responsibility for individual security, although what this concretely 
means is mostly still uncertain and interpretation-dependent. Social security 
nonetheless came to be the guiding concept of the welfare state (Kaufmann 
2015, 265-94). 
‘Social services’ on the other hand, as utilised in the Survey, combines so-
cial insurance as well as social assistance under a risk-based concept, but al-
ready marginalises the latter, by making its inclusion dependent on criteria 
prescribed by social insurance, such as its worker orientation. Additionally, it 
merely refers to institutions and thus does not produce unity on a normative 
level. Social assistance did not mobilise a strong lobby in the ILO. Nonethe-
less, the Survey did include both forms of social services, and as such might 
have contributed to the perception of a common horizon in cognitive terms, by 
surveying national systems of social services. Although such a common hori-
zon might have already been available in political imaginations of the time 
(Conrad 1996, 156-8), the communication of comparisons to the public has its 
own effect, as Heintz (2010, 167) argues. New social policies in one country 
could now be implemented in the light of old policies in others, policies from 
one end of the world could be compared with those at the other end (see for the 
relevance of a common horizon in social policy Berten and Leisering 2017). 
The integration of both social insurance and social assistance under the com-
mon rubric of ‘social services’ based on a rights-based notion is, as has been 
shown, an early indication of the later move towards the introduction of the 
‘social security’ concept. 
Although ‘productive’ benefits of social policies were discussed by the Cor-
respondence Committee, the GB actively put an end to the debate, effectively 
circumventing an agreement on these fundamentally normative questions. As 
can be seen from the reconstruction of the main lines of debate, especially 
employers’ representatives argued for comparisons on cost, based on wide-
spread ideas of social services as a large factor in the costs of production. Some 
government representatives that similarly argued for the reduction of public 
costs or were on the side of the employers approved of such an interpretation, 
whereas workers’ representatives and more social democratic-leaning govern-
ment representatives found themselves on the other side, but regretfully con-
ceded that the productive dimension of social policy defied quantification (ILO 
1926c, 337-9). In the end, no unifying order of worth was decided upon. 
In the interwar years, there was also no alternative hegemonic indicator that 
could function as rally point for the opposition. GDP had started its triumph in 
global politics and development only after WWII, and there was no movement 
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against it, comparable, for instance, to the 1960s and 1970s social indicator 
movement which only emerged in opposition to widespread economic hegem-
ony in statistics, or the Human Development Index (HDI), developed as a more 
inclusive alternative to GDP as measurement of a society’s progress (see also 
Lepenies 2019, in this issue). Neither was there an organisation that took up the 
task, as key proponent, of developing social service indicators, nor a discourse 
based on the idea of constant progress monitoring such as the one on evidence-
based policy-making and New Public Management and its constant drive to 
assessing policies’ quality and performance, that would have propelled indica-
tor development. 
As a matter of fact, similar problems would accompany the ILO much later, 
in the early 2000s. As an attempt to operationalise the concept of Decent Work 
that then Director-General Somavia circulated from the late 1990s on, the 
ILO’s Socio-Economic Security Programme developed a measurement of so-
cio-economic security of individuals and countries (ILO 2004). Its report in-
cluded country rankings in which mainly Western industrialised countries were 
top-rated. Developing countries and employers’ representatives fiercely criti-
cised the report – the former because it superimposed standardised criteria of 
performance without considering the different national economic conditions; 
the latter because they feared similar rankings of enterprises. After the Pro-
gramme was virtually closed down (Maier-Rigaud 2009, 170), further attempts 
at quantifying Decent Work ultimately led to a set of indicators still in need of 
further elaboration (ILO 2013b), but even in its most recent monitoring report 
the ILO shies away from strict country rankings based on more than infor-
mation-based indicators that have a more depoliticised image (ILO 2017; 
Berten and Leisering 2017, 157). 
The final statistics of cost included in the Survey show income and expendi-
ture of the respective schemes in the form of a two-column table. On the side of 
income, contributions are listed (contributing insured, employers, public subsi-
dies), as well as revenue from investments and other sources of income; on the 
side of expenditure, cash and in-kind benefits are listed, among administrative 
expenses and other expenditure. For social assistance schemes, a similar table 
is presented, showing on the income side state subsidies, subsidies from de-
partments, communes etc., contributions from persons assisted or their fami-
lies, revenue from investments and other income, and on the expenditure side 
cash and in-kind benefits, costs of administration and other expenses (ILO 
1933a, xvii-i). Enabling a comparison between the total income and total ex-
penditure, schemes can be evaluated as to their own economic efficiency. Ac-
cordingly, the statistics show that the desired state is self-sufficiency of each 
scheme, and an economic benchmark functions as structuring model. This 
obviously is consequential for the grounds on which social policies are and can 
be evaluated. 
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Although not an indicator per se, the cost statistics included in the Survey 
could be considered a provisional indicator. Without being based on a common 
metric and thereby not inherently comparable, the statistics of cost could be 
transformed to a ratio-based indicator fairly easily, if data was available, by 
regarding both sides of the table (or one) and following one of the suggestions 
of relating said figures to other statistics, described above. Later widely used 
social security indicators such as public social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP function similarly (ILO 2017, 203-4). 
According to the Office, all the warnings about international comparison did 
not prevent reactions that presented the Survey as contributing to ‘studies on 
the comparative cost of social services’, while at other times the non-
comparative nature of the Office’s publication was understood but criticised 
(ILO 1937, 6). The experts were aware of the danger and advised against com-
parative tables, focusing on the mere presentation of ‘facts’, but this way just 
dodged value statements themselves. The cost data – not relatives, but abso-
lutes – were missing an accompanying theory that would have made sense of 
them. Although the Survey abstained from directly comparing countries’ social 
policies, putting costs in the centre and arranging information in a two-column 
table, observers could conduct comparative evaluations themselves, based on 
their own ideas of quality and value and use the numbers for illustration. In an 
already prevalent discourse that devalues the costs imposed on production (ILO 
1925, 61-2), a juxtaposition of income and expenditure without adding infor-
mation on the productive dimension assigns higher value to those schemes that 
incur less costs (in relation to the wages, for instance), even if this is not explic-
itly postulated. Of course, the foundation of such evaluations is entirely discur-
sive in nature and not clearly suggested by the data. Since the information is 
not presupposing any specific utilisation, it is highly unpredictable how it is 
made relevant in policy-making (Lehtonen 2015, 80). 
5.  Conclusion 
In this article, I identified and scrutinised the conditions and decisions leading 
to a shared cognitive framework in the form of the Survey, i.e., the work neces-
sary for its production, and the reasons for the inclusion of little quantified data 
and a mere provisional indicator of cost. Since the Survey was the foundation 
for later studies such as The Cost of Social Security, it had a pioneering charac-
ter and became a reference point in its conclusions and interpretations of the 
‘social’ (ISSA 1955, 9-13). It introduced the question of comparability in social 
policy, having dealt for the first time from a globally comparative standpoint 
with issues of value and the relevance of ‘cost’ of social policies and provides 
an illustration of the perceived possibilities and hindrances of comparison in 
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this field that would in many respects accompany the ILO for the years to 
come. 
By scrutinising the conditions of production of the Survey, we can see how 
these influence the kinds of knowledge that are provided (similarly Davis et al. 
2012, 4). The Survey was produced following a proposal by the British gov-
ernment that had quite specific interests attached to it. It is also obvious that 
contemporary discourses have had their influence in the production in the first 
place, namely the idea of reducing public expenditure and the costs of produc-
tion. Yet not only did the initial proposal change, the process of knowledge 
production also shows difficulties of organisational steering throughout. Expert 
committees and the Office through their rules of work and standards of com-
prehensiveness, and more concretely their ability to decide on the inclusion or 
exclusion of schemes and scheme types, had a considerable influence in the 
resulting Survey, nonetheless mediated by the Governing Body which more 
than once exercised its veto power when it did not appreciate their work, espe-
cially visible in the negative reactions to the Correspondence Committee’s first 
and only report. The Governing Body even put in place a committee of its own 
to assist the work on the Survey, which more explicitly consolidated its influ-
ence over the production process. Notwithstanding, the process – by not being 
limited to a unitary actor – developed a life of its own. It is observable that the 
different constituents of the ILO occupied different positions based on their 
political leanings, though the debates never erupted into open political conflict. 
More technical statements merged with those regarding value and normative 
ideas. 
Debates concentrated around the ways social policy could be further defined 
and the possibilities of comparison, but did not engage with the actual infor-
mation. This is not surprising when recalling the way the organisation went 
about the Survey’s production. Data and information came from state admin-
istrations, so the ILO could rely on the legitimacy of state measurements and 
official counts. The organisation, including the Office, ‘merely’ decided upon 
the way it would arrange this information into categories and standardise these 
into a common frame – a consequential process nonetheless. 
How can we explain the unilaterally cost-based statistics of social services 
in the Survey that most closely match the format of an indicator of expenditure? 
Interestingly, the problems with developing alternatives to the cost-based statis-
tics resemble later struggles formulated during the social indicator movement. 
As this movement’s origin was a critique of exclusively economically-
understood and -defined problems and phenomena instead of ‘social’ ones 
(with ‘social’ defined here essentially in opposition to ‘economic’), it aimed at 
developing alternative social indicators, such as of ‘quality of life’, in opposi-
tion to economic growth as indicator of development, progress and general 
quality of a society. Apart from problems of comparability stemming from 
wide-ranging differences in cultural and social traditions across the globe that 
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would all impact the interpretation of such indicators, the problem is that eco-
nomic indicators already contain a common denominator: monetary units. This 
common denominator solves the problem of comparison, or in other words: 
commensuration of qualities is achieved through the fiction of objective prices, 
comparable across divisions, such as enterprises or societies (see also Kauf-
mann 1974, 204). The productive dimension of social services could not resort 
to an already established common denominator. In the case of the Survey, of 
course, the cost data was not made comparable in full; comparison was imped-
ed by not choosing to equalise monetary units through translating them into a 
shared framework, though it was not made impossible for the observer to do so, 
either. 
The descriptive approach to cost though did not sufficiently take account of 
the relevance of theories underlying measurements and data presentation. Alt-
hough ILO staff and experts did try to fall back to simply ‘present the facts’, 
every measurement and presentation of data is a decision regarding what is 
deemed relevant, and has repercussions. The final publication should thus not 
be seen as a mere representation of social policies, but as an active interven-
tion, mediated by politics and expert decisions. At the time of the publication 
of the Survey, implicit interpretations stemming from common theories of the 
economic and the social, for instance regarding the value of social services, 
could get utilised to interpret the cost data. By not reflecting sufficiently upon 
their existence and delivering alternative interpretations, observers could be 
guided by their own theory regarding the explanation of the information and 
cause-effect relations. In fact, this was one of the central elements missing to 
produce a ‘real’ indicator: an accompanying theory or concept that the data 
would be related to that was not directly measurable itself and could more 
distinctly direct the interpretation of the data in specific ways. 
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